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Security in vehicles with IoT by prioritization rules,
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Abstract—The Internet of vehicles (IoV) provides new oppor-
tunities for the coordination of vehicles for enhancing safety
and transportation performance. Vehicles can be coordinated
for avoiding collisions by communicating their positions when
near to each other, in which the information flow is indexed by
their geographical positions or the ones in road maps. Vehicles
can also be coordinated to ameliorate traffic jams by sharing
their locations and destinations. Vehicles can apply optimization
algorithms to reduce the overuse of certain streets without
excessively enlarging the paths. In this way, traveling time can
be reduced. However, IoV also brings security challenges, such
as keeping safe from virtual hijacking. In particular, vehicles
should detect and isolate the hijacked vehicles ignoring their
communications. The current work presents a technique for
enhancing security by applying certain prioritization rules, using
digital certificates, and applying trust and reputation policies for
detecting hijacked vehicles. We tested the proposed approach
with a novel agent-based simulator about security in IoT for
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications (ABS-SecIoTV2V). The
experiments focused on the scenario of avoidance of collisions
with hijacked vehicles misinforming other vehicles. The results
showed that the current approach increased the average speed
of vehicles with a 64.2% when these are giving way to other
vehicles in a crossing by means of IoT.
Index Terms—agent-based simulation, coordination, intelligent
transportation, security, reputation, trust
I. INTRODUCTION
Some smart vehicles can interact among each other, by
means of Internet of Things (IoT), conforming a new field
named as Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoV) [1]. Vehicles
can cooperate for conforming Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs) with different routing protocols [2]. In addition,
Internet of public transport vehicles can support VANETs by
means of communication among vehicle groups that dynami-
cally change [3]. In this context, vehicles can cooperate among
each other (a) to avoid collisions, (b) to estimate the routes
with least traffic, or (c) to arrange the best routes for avoiding
waiting times in the charging stations for electric vehicles [4].
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These are some of the most important issues that require the
vehicles’ data collection. These data should be transferred in a
secure way with mechanisms like the existing one for big data
collection from vehicles via a mutual authentication and single
sign-on algorithm [5]. The security in the Internet of Vehicles
(IoV) can also be useful for safely making the emergency
rescue operations more efficient, and gathering reliable proofs
of accidents such as the speeds and positions of vehicles [6].
Vehicles can connect among each other through vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communications and with the city infrastructure
by means of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications.
Both kinds of communication can support real-time operations
[7]. For instance, V2V communications can be useful for de-
tecting traffic congestion in large-scale scenarios [8] or coop-
erating for car parking [9]. For example, V2I communications
can support the stabilization of vehicle strings for reducing
disturbances, with adaptive driving strategies [10]. In addition,
vehicles can also use V2I communications in a street-aware
and Intelligent Beaconless forwarding protocol for achieving
fast and reliable communications in urban vehicular scenarios
[11].
Vehicles with IoT and autonomous decisions on motion
imply many challenges for the viewpoint of security and
safety, as one can observe in the variety of possible attacks
over self-driving vehicles [12]. If a vehicle is able to brake,
turn or accelerate for avoiding a collision based on the
information received by Internet, the car must completely
validate the veracity of this information. Otherwise, a hijacked
vehicle could provoke collisions or make other vehicles to
unnecessarily stop. The hijacked vehicle would achieve this by
intentionally sending wrong information to the other vehicles.
There are several mechanisms for performing traffic simu-
lations. For example, model-driven development can be used
for this kind of simulation as in the work [13], which defines a
domain-specific modeling language for defining traffic simula-
tions. In addition, agent-based simulators (ABSs) have proven
to be useful for simulating IoV. In this context, vehicles are
modelled as agents, and V2V communications are simulated
as social interactions among agents [9]. In this line, agent
technology was proposed to improve the routing in VANETs
with a novel clustering algorithm [14].
Several works proposed different solutions for supporting
authentication in vehicular networks. For instance, VANETs
used authentication by means of the Elliptic Curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm in broadcast messages, considering
privacy, probabilistic and defense from DDoS attacks [15].
In addition, Scheme for IEEE 802.11p was improved for
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V2I communications with a lightweight authentication that
focused on security and privacy of vehicles [16]. The trust
management has proven to be useful in VANETs for maintain-
ing security in VANETs considering probabilistic approaches,
deterministic ones and combination of these [17]. Vehicles
need to verify that the locations reported by other vehicles
are both accurate and reliable. For example, R. Kasana et
al. [18] improved the accuracy of locations by considering
neighbor locations. In addition, S. Dalya Khalid et al. [19] used
transferable belief models for ensuring security in the sharing
of vehicle locations. When vehicular networks are open to
other heterogeneous communications, these usually raise many
security challenges, as reviewed by Kaiwartya et al. [20] when
presenting their architecture for IoV. Some of these challenges
are related with the location accuracy, location verification,
location privacy and the operational management of all the
traffic of the different networks.
In this context, the current work proposes an approach
aimed at maintaining security and safety in vehicles with IoT.
It combines proper authentication by asymmetric encryption,
prioritization rules and management of trust and reputation
over vehicles identifiers. The current approach is illustrated
with a novel ABS about security in IoT with V2V communi-
cations (ABS-SecIoTV2V).
The current article is organized as follows. The next section
introduces the most relevant related work highlighting the gap
covered by the current work. Section III presents the tech-
nique for achieving security in the IoV from virtual hijacking
focusing on respectively the prioritization rules, the vehicle
certificates and the trust management. It also presents the novel
ABS about collision avoidance in crossroads for illustrating the
current approach. Section IV presents the experiments that we
conducted for assessing the current approach. Finally, section
V mentions the conclusions and depicts some future research
lines.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents some relevant works related to collab-
orative autonomous vehicles, IoT supported vehicles and the
infrastructure needed to support this.
The development of infrastructures that offer support for
smart vehicle networks, nowadays, due to the evolution of
smart cities is one of the most relevant topics of the decade,
conforming fields such as IoV. This type of infrastructure will
try to maximize communications for allowing the safe transit
of autonomous vehicles [21]. This application has implicit
important aspects to deal with, such as road safety and the
correct prioritization of traffic, according to a series of rules.
The final goal of developing this kind of infrastructures could
be reaching destination on time.
One of the most important issues to take into account is
how to predict the traffic density and estimating the required
time to reach a destination [22]. In this sense, R. Sun et al.
[23] proposed a cooperative vehicle infrastructure system to
control and monitoring the traffic speed and density using
microscopic data. Their model was based on the hypothesis
that a vehicle will move to the downstream during a period
of time. Therefore, the travel distance of each vehicle was
calculated using its average speed during a single time step,
and its speed was influenced by several consecutive links
instead of one. For predicting the speed of a vehicle, they
considered the evolution of the average speed of the different
downstream links and the current link. Finally, by registering
the number of vehicles in each link, it was possible to calculate
the traffic density. Therefore, combining the traffic density of
the link and the average speed of the vehicle, it was possible
to determine the macroscopic variables during the established
time period. The results showed that through the proposed
model it was possible to foresee the congestion points.
Another relevant approach was presented by R. Kala [24].
This work presented an intelligent transportation system to
decrease the travel time of vehicles and avoiding conges-
tions. The article aimed at making the transportation system
cooperative to favor the vehicles for not running late. The
author modelled the mechanism by which a vehicle judged its
running status and decided whether to ask for cooperation.
The mechanism was able to combine and coordinate the
vehicles movement, the traffic lights and lane changes, which
helped to prioritize the vehicles running late. Experimental
results showed that a lesser number of vehicles reached their
destinations late when using their approach.
Several works proposed trust management mechanisms for
vehicles with IoT. For instance, A. Bhargava et al. [25]
proposed a trust scheme to improve the vehicle’s safety and
security in IoV. The proposal was based on the Dempster
Shafer Theorem (DST) to imbibe uncertainty and lack of suffi-
cient data about a vehicle for quick trust update. Authors used
the iterative trust computation based on the direct interaction
with the vehicles and feedback from the neighbors. The model
took into account four different trust levels for characterizing
vehicle’s behavior. Results showed that the mechanism could
be scalable and was suitable to be used in IoV environment
even when vehicle exhibited changing behavior in presence of
a small number of vehicles in the neighborhood. Moreover,
F. Gai et al. [26] proposed a Ratee-based Trust Management
(RTM) system that guaranteed that each node stored its own
reputation information recorded during the past transactions.
Authors also introduced a credible CA server to be sure the
integrality and the non-deniability of the trust information
is guaranteed. The RTM was implemented taking SIoV into
account where the relationships established between nodes
were utilized to enhance the accuracy of trustworthiness. In
their experiments, their proposed scheme presented faster con-
vergence and higher transaction success rate, and the time cost
for calculating trustworthiness met the demand of vehicular
networks.
Wu He et al. [27] presented an interesting modular multi-
layered vehicular data platform based on cloud computing and
IoT technologies. Along the paper, authors discussed on the
cloud services and how they could be implemented to perform
and make intelligent decision for the correct vehicular data
management. Authors proposed a novel software architecture
for the vehicular data clouds which presented the capabilities
of integrating several IoT devices available in vehicles and in
the road infrastructure.
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Furthermore, it is important to highlight that a smart and
secure vehicular network should incorporate the use of sensors.
In this sense, A. Mansoori and C. Acha [28] proposed the
use of intelligent wireless sensor networks to prevent loss
of electricity by the unnecessary usage of street lights at
night. The system was based on the use of ultrasonic sensors,
RASPBERRY PI3 and camera module installed on road to
detect the vehicles that were not following the traffic rules.
Some ABSs simulate traffic, since agents can adopt different
drivers’ behaviors in vehicles as well as other people such as
pedestrian. For instance, E. Karaaslan et al. [29] presented an
ABS for simulating the repercussion of electric vehicles on
the safety of pedestrians because these vehicles have silent
engines. Their simulated results showed that the pedestrian
traffic safety risk increased 30% with electric vehicles under
high ambient sound levels, and it increased 10% under low
sound levels. In addition, K. Malecki [30] developed an ABS
about the influence of drivers’ behaviors when looking for
on-street parking on the traffic flow. Their simulated results
showed that efficient on-street parking of motorists and car
drivers paying attention to streamlined parking improved traf-
fic flow efficiency significantly. However, none of these ABSs
simulated strategies for maintaining security on vehicles with
IoT when there were hijacked vehicles.
Nevertheless, none of the aforementioned works combined
prioritization rules, digital vehicle certificates with asymmetric
encryption and trust and reputation policies, in order to make
vehicles secure from misinformation of hijacked vehicles. The
current work covers this gap of the literature with the technique
proposed in the next section.
III. TECHNIQUE FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN
VEHICLES WITH IOT
The current work proposes to maintain security in vehicles
with IoT by combining prioritization rules, vehicle certificates
and trust management. Figure 1 shows an overview of the
current approach. Each vehicle with IoT includes the instal-
lation of the mechanism for taking decisions based on the
prioritization rules in order to determine which orders should
follow. Each vehicle has a validated certificate represented by
a private key of asymmetric encryption provided by an official
certifier entity. The vehicles can interchange signed messages
and authenticate the identity of the sender by using the public
key provided by the official certifier entity. The vehicles can
manage the trust on vehicles by analyzing whether theirs
messages have any misinformation. Vehicles also share the
direct trust in a peer-to-peer distribution model, so vehicles
can take decisions based on the reputation of the vehicle that
is sending the messages.
The subsections describe each of the most relevant as-
pects of the current approach. Subsection III-A describes the
prioritization rules that are involved in the decision-making
process of vehicles. Subsection III-B indicates the certification
mechanism used by vehicles. Subsection III-C introduces the
trust and reputation mechanism of the current approach. Sub-
section III-D presents the ABS for illustrating and assessing
the current approach.
A. Prioritization rules
Self-driving vehicles can have an interface for communica-
tions and coordination among vehicle. This approach proposes
to add a layer just right after the kernel of the operative system
of the vehicle with some prioritization rules for basic security.
This layer should not have writing permissions for any user.
In this way, no one would be able to overwrite it.
In this safe layer, the vehicle will not able to accelerate if
another vehicle is closer than a proximity threshold based on
the proximity sensor. The car will not turn right if this means
going out of the road or crashing to any object. In this way,
the vehicle will avoid collisions that can be avoided by their
own sensors. This layer constitutes the first level of priority.
In the second level of priority, the orders of the driver are
followed unless breaking any of the very basic rules of the
aforementioned first level.
In the third level of priority, vehicles can take actions based
on IoT. This could support self-driving supervised by the
driver. This is the level that needs the security measures for
avoiding collisions or any damages due to misinformation by
hijacked vehicles.
This current approach authenticates vehicles by digital cer-
tificates, and manages trust and reputation to decide whether to
rely on the information provided by a vehicle. Figure 2 shows
the block diagram regarding the application of the prioritiza-
tion rules when receiving an order or information from another
vehicle with IoT. The first step is to apply the asymmetric
encryption to determine whether the sender is authenticated. If
the sender is not authenticated, then the message is completely
ignored because (a) it is not reliable, (b) neither can trust
and reputation be built about an unidentified sender. Then,
the current approach applies the three aforementioned security
layers based on the prioritization. Finally, the current approach
analyzes whether the information provided by the sender was
reliable. In this way, the current vehicle can update its trust
on the sender and share this trust with peers.
B. Vehicle certificates
The current technique relies on the authentication of ve-
hicles. In particular, each vehicle should have an identifier
based in the number of the license plate. This approach
uses asymmetric encryption for this purpose. This technique
proposes to apply the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
for the asymmetric encryption as it is well-validated that it
is secure for signing messages, and it is commonly used
by public institutions. The owner or manufacturer of each
vehicle requests a digital certificate through the online service
provided by the certifier. Then, they bring the vehicle to the
certified accreditation center. This makes sure that this vehicle
is the one identified by its number with a double check with the
manufacturer of the vehicle. Then, the certified accreditation
entity provides a private key to the vehicle, so this can
incorporate in their system without reading permission, so
no one can access it. The certified accreditation entity makes
its public key available, so that other vehicles can verify the
identity of this vehicle.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed technique for maintaining security in vehicles with IoT
From this point forward, the vehicle will sign all its mes-
sages with its validated certificate. The other vehicles can
verify its authenticity by decrypting the hash summary of the
message with the public key provided by the certified identity.
In order to maintain the security, vehicles will only consider
messages authenticated with this system. In this way, even
hijacked vehicles will need to sign their messages with their
true identifier for communicating with other vehicles. Even
though, hijacked vehicles could send misinformation with their
true identity. In order to avoid the impact of these attacks,
the current approach uses the trust and reputation policy
introduced in the next section.
C. Trust and reputation management
The current approach uses trust and reputation management
for tracking the vehicles with malware in order to isolate these
and discard their messages.
For this purpose, vehicles corroborate the information re-
ceived by other vehicles with the information sensed by their
own sensors in real-time and afterwards. In some cases, a
vehicle could ask other vehicles about the information sensed
with their sensors in order to further analyze some cases of
possible misinformation.
For example, if a vehicle X reports a location and a speed
that will imply a collision on a vehicle Y in a crossroads and
asks it to stop, then vehicle Y is forced to stop to give way
to vehicle X. However, vehicle Y will check if any vehicle
gets to the crossroads with its sensors. If that is not the case,
vehicle Y assumes that vehicle X reported an unnecessary
alert message, and classifies this message as suspicious. In
some unlikely cases, it could have happened that vehicle X
needed to stop for any other reason. Thus, it cannot be directly
classified as malicious but if these suspicious messages are
frequent by one vehicle, then this approach assumes that it
has a malicious behavior. In each vehicle, the trust model
is constituted by recording the number of messages received
by each other vehicle and the number of these that were
classified as suspicious. Each vehicle trusts another vehicle
if either it has not enough data about it or the ratio of non-
suspicious messages divided by the number of interchanged
messages surpasses certain threshold. This approach does not
only consider the trust based on direct contact with a vehicle,
but also the reputation which is this same information observed
by other vehicles. This information can be shared by both V2V
communications or through a common databased managed by
a certified institution. In this shared model, the reputation
is also evaluated by calculating the ratio of non-suspicious
messages divided by the number of interchanged messages
and comparing this ratio with a threshold.
In this way, each vehicle can have a direct trust on another
vehicle regarding the direct messages interchanged with it.
The vehicle can also have information trust of other third-
party vehicles on another vehicle, which is normally referred
as reputation in the specialized literature [31]. The reputation
is propagated through V2V communications, in which the
trust of vehicle X on vehicle Y is propagated signed with
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Fig. 2. Block diagram regarding the prioritization rules
a validated certificate by vehicle X. In this way, hijacked
vehicles cannot significantly alter the reputation of any vehicle,
since it cannot send trust scores with false identifiers. In
addition to the fast and peer-to-peer communication in real-
time through the network, vehicles will report this information
also to the certification entity. This entity will collect this
information, and if the reputation of vehicle is below certain
threshold with a representative amount of data, then the entity
revokes its certificate, until the software of this vehicle is reset
to its initial state by the manufacturer.
By means of this approach, the hijacked vehicles will
be discarded, and all its communication will be ignored by
other vehicles, when the certification entity has detected its
misbehavior. The manufacturer can revise the vehicle and
ask again for a validate certificate with the commitment of
investigating the reasons why this vehicle was hijacked.
D. Agent-based simulator for testing security strategies
This work includes the novel ABS called ABS-SecIoTV2V
for defining and assessing different variations of the strategies
applied in the current technique. This ABS has been developed
following TABSAOND (a technique for developing ABS apps
and online tools with nondeterministic decisions) [32] in order
to simulate non-deterministic decisions in realistic scenarios.
This ABS has developed with NetLogo simulation tool, since
this tool has proven its utility for simulating different kinds
of networks [33]. In the initial stages, we also considered
using a specific environment for traffic simulation instead of
NetLogo, and more concretely the most feasible option was
the open-source RoadTrafficSimulation environment. How-
ever, we finally selected NetLogo because it explicitly used
and agent-based approach with common operations such as
explicit and implicit communications among agents, which
were useful for designing V2V communications and managing
the information received from vehicle sensors about other
vehicles. In addition, NetLogo was designed for allowing users
to easily define different agent behaviors, being this useful not
only for implementing different security agent strategies but
also implementing different behaviors of hijacked vehicles.
Although RoadTrafficSimulation was open source and theo-
retically could be modified in anyway, the implementation of
these agent strategies would have required firstly to implement
some basic operations and to refactor some of its underlying
structure. We selected NetLogo to avoid all this extra initial
development effort and time.
In this ABS, the vehicles of the horizontal road give way
to the vehicles in the vertical road. The horizontal vehicles
ask the positions of vertical cars to them through IoT in
order give them way when approaching the crossroads. One
of the vertical cars simulates to be hijacked and reports fake
positions. In particular, it provides the position of the crossing,
so the vehicle waits in the give-way even if it is not necessary.
In other words, the hijacked vehicle performs an attack in
which another vehicle activates the brakes unnecessarily as it
is informed about the existence of a fake possible collision.
The hijacked vehicle only provides fake positions to vehicles
in a limited distance range, so its behavior is more difficult to
be detected.
Figure 3 shows the main excerpt of the User Interface (UI),
which includes the input controls and the graphical visualiza-
tion of the simulation. In the vertical cars, the hijacked car
is represented with red, while the others are represented with
blue. The horizontal cars use random colors. As commonly in
NetLogo simulators, the “Setup” button reset the simulator to
its initial state, and the “Go” button runs and pause the sim-
ulation alternatively. The simulator also allows users to select
the number of cars visible in the simulation in respectively
the horizontal and vertical roads. Notice that ABS-SecIoTV2V
6
uses a wrapped map in which when a vehicle agent leaves the
screen, it enters again in the opposite side, and consequently
a few number of agents can simulate a continuous traffic of
vehicles.
Figure 4 shows the UI graph about the speed of the vehicles
that give way in the crossing. It represents the average speed of
all the vehicles in each simulated second (denoted as “Speed”
in the graph or also instantaneous speed in this article). This
graph also shows an average speed from the beginning of the
simulation to the current moment (referred as “Avg. Speed”
in the graph). It is worth noting that the instantaneous speed
has large variations since it is very sensible to the number of
vehicles stopped in the crossing for giving way to any vehicle.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In this experimentation, we used six vehicles in the horizon-
tal road and three vehicles in the vertical road simultaneously
displayed in the visualization of the simulation in ABS-
SecIoTV2V. The horizontal vehicles give way to the ones in
the vertical road.
In order to assess the current approach, we simulated ABS-
SecIoTV2V with the currently proposed security approach
and with a control mechanism. Both used the same behavior
related with traffic, in the sense that in both mechanisms
the horizontal vehicles gave way to the other vehicles in the
crossing considering the same threshold distance and the same
area for stopping. In both scenarios, vehicles reached 50 Km/h
when they did not have to give way to other vehicles.
The difference between the current approach and the control
one is that the latter one relied on the information provided
by other vehicles, while the current one followed all the steps
mentioned in section III.
Figure 5 shows the results of speed when using the current
approach. This graph shows the instantaneous average speed of
all the vehicles in the road with the give-way in every second,
and is referred as “Speed”. The speed had large variations,
because in the crossroads some vehicles had to stop to give
way to other vehicles, and consequently these stopped vehicles
had a speed of zero value. The number of stopped vehicles
varied regarding the coincidences of vehicles in the crossroads
from different directions. It also shows the average speed
considering these same cars but from the beginning of the
simulation referred as “Avg. Speed”. One can observe that the
final global average speed was 37.1 Km/h of the vehicles in
the road with the give-way.
Figure 6 shows the simulation results when using the control
mechanism. In this scenario, the vehicles were not prepared
to detect fake V2V communications, and consequently they
did not detect the misinformation from the hijacked vehicle.
As one can observe in the speed of cars, higher amounts of
cars stopped more frequently as they used the brakes to give
way in cases that was not necessary. The final global average
speed was 22.6 Km/h.
Figure 7 compares the average speed between the current
approach and the control one. From the instant of 150 s of
simulation until the end (i.e. 1000 s of simulated time), the
average speed of the current approach was considerably higher
than with the control mechanism. The current approach had
an improvement percentage of 64.2% in the final global av-
erage speed of vehicles. The average speed improved because
with the current approach vehicles were able to detect the
misinformation of hijacked vehicles, by means of the trust
and reputation mechanism. In this manner, hijacked vehicles
were not able to force other vehicles to stop unnecessarily
by taking advantage of their vulnerabilities of the collision-
avoidance safety system. It is worth mentioning that when the
simulation had dense traffic, if a vehicle was unnecessarily
forced to activate their brakes in a crossroads for a while, then
all the other vehicles following this vehicle also needed to stop
forming a queue of vehicles waiting to the first one to cross
the crossroads. Thus, avoiding all these circumstances with
the current approach improved the traffic flow performance as
reflected in the increase of average speed of vehicles.
Moreover, we tested the trust and reputation mechanism.
In this case, we used a different ABS that allowed us to
simulate a larger number of vehicles. This ABS was inspired
by the existing ABS-TrustSDN [34], with the differences of
having peer-to-peer distribution of reputation and revocation
of certificates by the official certifier.
In particular, we simulated that 95% of the messages with
non-compromised vehicles were considered as reliable. We
did not consider that all the messages were properly detected
reliable since traffic depended on many variables including
the different calibration of sensors (e.g. proximity, cameras
and so) and environmental circumstances.
We simulated hijacked vehicles with smart strategies in
which only 30% of the messages where intentionally mali-
cious. Thus, other vehicles classified 65% of the messages of
hijacked vehicles as reliable. In this way, hijacked vehicles
were more difficult to be detected. In this simulation, we used
85 normal smart vehicles with IoT and 15 hijacked vehicles.
In this approach, we used a reputation strategy based on the
history of failures of each vehicle for determining the trust on
each vehicle. This strategy was based on post-analyzing the
communications with a specific vehicle to determine whether
the messages from these vehicles were suspicious (probably
sending false information). This method required a minimum
number of post-analyzed messages (i.e., 5) for calculating
a representative trust assessment on this vehicle. After this
minimum window threshold was reached, this vehicle was
trusted only if the ratio of non-suspicious messages in the
recorded history were equal or greater to a certain threshold
(i.e., 60%). This assessment was performed by all the available
information propagated among the different vehicles conform-
ing the reputation of the vehicle.
Figure 8 compares the evolution of the average reputation
of smart vehicles with IoT and the reputation of hijacked
vehicles. The reputation was recalculated in each interaction
among vehicles with IoT, and consequently the graphs shows
the evolution along the number of interactions, which is
displayed in the abscissa axis. The average reputation is
represented as a percentage, in which 100% represents the
highest reliability according to the collected trust measure-
ments reported by peers. As one can observe, the reputation
of hijacked vehicles dropped down in comparison with other
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Fig. 3. Input controls and graphic simulation in the UI of ABS-SecIoTV2V
Fig. 4. Graph about speed in the UI of ABS-SecIoTV2V
vehicles, whose reputation increased to values near 100%
over the time. Thus, vehicles properly detected the hijacked
vehicles and reported these to the certifier entity. In this way,
their certificates were revoked and the other vehicles ignored
their messages. It is worth mentioning that the reputation of
hijacked vehicles did not drop to almost zero, because once
the certification entity revoked their digital certificates, their























Fig. 5. Speed of vehicles with the current technique
V. CONCLUSION
This article has proposed a technique for maintaining secu-
rity in vehicles connected to Internet from virtual hijacking.
This technique combines the use of prioritization rules from
discarding some virtual attacks by relying more on sensors and
drivers’ actions. It uses digital certificates with a certification
entity and asymmetric encryption in order to authenticate the
messages from the real vehicles and keep track of their mes-
sages and actions. This technique uses peer-to-peer trust and
reputation policies to isolate the hijacked vehicles and ignore
their messages. The novel ABS-SecIoTV2V simulator applies
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Fig. 7. Comparison of average speeds of vehicles between the current
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Fig. 8. Comparison of reputation between normal smart vehicles and hijacked
ones with the proposed technique
collisions with IoT by activating the brakes when a collision
is forecasted in a crossroads. The hijacked vehicles report
their fake locations so other vehicles unnecessarily activate
their brakes when there is not any danger of collision. The
simulation results showed that in the current approach vehicles
properly distinguished between hijacked vehicles from others,
by managing trust and reputation based on the information
directly observed and the one received from other vehicles.
The simulation results also showed that the current approach
improved the traffic flow performance as reflected in the
increase of average speed of vehicles.
The current work is planned to be extended by applying
the current approach in other virtual attacks on vehicles
connected to Internet. For example, we will apply the current
approach for avoiding misinformation regarding fake loca-
tions to make confusion in the coordination for avoiding
traffic jams. Another future work is to assess the current
technique when executed with common vehicle processors
and communications to measure the response times of both
the algorithms and the involved communications, in order to
determine if this approach is feasible for avoiding accidents
in real-time. In order to commercialize the current approach,
we will need to work separately in three different components.
First, we will need to develop a component that supports V2V
communications through the most accepted regulation in the
European Commission, which is probably ITS-G5. This com-
ponent needs to be integrated within the vehicle and we will
implement it in collaboration with some vehicle manufacturer.
The second module will provide a high-level programming
interface to access all the operations of the vehicle, and again
we will need the collaboration with the vehicle manufacturer.
The third component will translate the proposed strategies to
the corresponding programming language with access to the
two other components. Finally, we would need a great private
or public investment for marketing and promoting the use of
vehicles with this extra functionality of secure coordination
among vehicles. In this process, we will try to provide a low-
cost solution so it can become popular and feasible from a
business-model viewpoint.
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